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CHAPTER 13 
Land Use and Planning Law 
RICHARD G. HUBER 
A. ZONING 
§13.1. Adoption and amendment of local zoning. The constant 
battle in zoning between the need for administrative flexibility and 
the necessity of guarding against administrative arbitrariness resulted, 
during the 1962 SURVEY year, in an opinion and a statute both of con-
siderable importance. Acts of 1962, c. 327, amended G.L., c. 40A, §6, 
by adding the following brief sentence: "No provision of a zoning ordi-
nance or by-laws shall be valid which sets apart zoning districts· or 
zones by establishing between them a boundary line which may sub-
sequently be changed without the adoption of an amendment to a 
zoning ordinance or by-law so changing such line." The wisdom of 
this amendment depends upon the confidence one wishes to place in 
local governing bodies. The trend in zoning generally has been to 
give local agencies greater flexibility in applying standards and re-
quirements.1 Thus, for example, some states permit "floating zones," 
which are zones not assigned to any specific physical area but which, 
when the requirements are met, local authorities may assign to spe-
cific property upon application. "Shifting zones" permit the local 
authorities to change land assigned from one zone to another, when 
the applicant and the land meet specific requirements. Other such 
flexible devices, as "cluster zoning," 2 permit local authorities to change 
specific regulations within zones when certain conditions are met. All 
of these flexible devices are designed to alleviate the rigidity of the 
zoning envelope; zoning as generally set up fails to consider variations 
in local needs, in patterns of development, and population trends, as 
well as developments like highways which cut through and change the 
land use pattern of a municipality without its consent or concurrence. 
The amending procedure is available but cumbersome and almost 
always subject to criticism, often accepted by the courts, as spot zoning. 
A completely new system of regulation could be adopted but, beyond 
RICHARD G. HUBER is Professor of Law at Boston College Law School and Editor 
in Chief of the ANNUAL SURVEY. 
§13.1. 1 See Urban Land Institute, Technical Bulletin 40, New Approaches to 
Residential Land Development (1961), for excellent brief comments on flexible 
zoning and land use regulation. 
2 Cluster zoning is represented in Massachusetts by the New Seabury develop-
ment in Mashpee, on Cape Cod. 
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its cumbersome nature, it is not appropriate when all that is sought to 
be changed is the zoning of a relatively small area. 
Opposing flexibility, of course, is the entirely reasonable fear of ad-
ministrative license. One need not be particularly sophisticated to 
realize that local zoning changes are often ill-advised and perhaps even 
unworthily motivated. The present legislation expresses this fear by 
its total prohibition of at least "shifting zones" and similar zone bound-
ary change, and its inferences against flexible zoning as a device for 
remedying zoning conflicts and unreasonableness. Local authorities 
thus must use the cumbersome amending procedure or local boards 
of appeals can continue to grant variances, as some do, freely and eas-
ily; enough grants are not appealed so that a large number of improp-
erly granted variances are created, which in some municipalities has in 
part destroyed the integrity of the zoning plan. 
The Commonwealth needs seriously, perhaps even desperately, to 
rethink its zoning and related land use legislation. Piecemeal legisla-
tion like the present statute, probably designed to strike down regu-
lations in only a few municipalities, may require no thinking - always 
a restful approach to legislative policy - but hardly represents any 
sensible solution to the problem of flexibility. The variance procedure 
- the major device to obtain flexibility under the present enabling act 
- has been tried for many years, and its results have been erratic, often 
nonsensical, sometimes even tragic, and certainly most productive of 
litigation. A state as densely populated as is much of Massachusetts, 
with competing demands upon its land resources, can hardly be happy 
with the present situation, if its results are once seriously considered. 
More happily, the Supreme Judicial Court, although not without 
dissent, upheld what is often denominated "contract zoning" in Syl-
vania Electric Products Inc. v. City of Newton.S The city amended its 
zoning ordinance to rezone certain land from a single residence to a 
light manufacturing district. The Court sustained the change against 
the usual spot zoning argument largely because of the physical charac-
teristics of the land and the substantial changes in adjoining land use. 
More importantly, however, the Court sustained the amendment 
against the contention that restrictions imposed by covenants in a 
deed attached to an option given by Sylvania to the city were, if not 
conditions imposed by the city, a substantial inducement to its adop-
tion of the rezoning. The restrictions in the covenants limited the 
land use considerably beyond the normal restrictions applicable to a , 
light manufacturing district. The Court in effect held that the deed 
covenants were not zoning restrictions in themselves; the city merely 
determined that the tract of land, as voluntarily subjected to the 
option restrictions, was appropriate for reclassification for light manu-
facturing. This was "an appropriate and untainted exercise of the 
zoning power." The Court found that the city's activities in promot-
ing the adoption of the option restrictions were "all extrastatutory but 
81962 Mass. Adv. Sh. 883, 183 N.E.2d U8. 
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nevertheless, proper activity, precedent to the exercise of the zoning 
power, not the exercise thereof." 
The dissent of Mr. Justice Kirk emphasized that the imposition of 
the covenant restrictions could not be separated from the exercise of 
the zoning power - that the two actions were an inseparable unit. 
Thus, since all restrictions are thus zoning restrictions, they have to be 
imposed under Chapter 40A procedure, which was not followed. The 
logic of the dissent is probably more attractive than thll-t of the ma-
jority opinion, since it does not have to deal with the close distinctions 
necessary to support the majority thesis. But the result reached by 
the majority does obtain a desirable flexibility without interference 
with any strong public policy. It is true, as the dissent notes, that 
somewhat more complete notice of the extent and particulars of the 
total changes could have been given to interested parties but, as a 
public hearing was held, the question is properly one of degree rather 
than of any violation of statutory policy. The history of the Newton-
Sylvania arrangement does, in fact, offer an excellent example of an 
intelligent flexible solution to a difficult problem. Both Sylvania and 
the city attained their particular goals; adjoining landowners and resi-
dents were effectively protected, although perhaps not to the maximum 
extent they might have desired. Full publicity was in fact given to 
the arrangement, but Mr. Justice Kirk's admonition that procedural 
requirements should have been followed deserves attention. Full 
disclosure and proper notice could readily be required without in any 
way entailing any prohibition of so-called contract zoning. 
Other legislation relating to the adoption and amendment of zoning 
ordinances was largely designed to require full disclosure and proper 
notice. Acts of 1962, c. 201, amended Section 6 of Chapter 40A. The 
required date for the first notice of the various hearings was reduced 
from twenty-one to fourteen days before the hearing. In addition the 
notice must henceforth include the "subject matter, sufficient for iden-
tification. " 
Several cases of less importance involving the adoption and amend-
ment of zoning regulations were also decided during the 1962 SURVEY 
year. Kitty v. City of Springfield 4 decided that an amendment of the 
Springfield zoning ordinance had been improperly adopted. Local 
custom that permitted the reviewing of defeated legislation was .not 
permitted to override G.L., c. 40A, §§6, 7 and 8, requiring a morato-
rium on adoption of a defeated zoning amendment for two years unless 
the adoption is recommended by the local planning board. Atherton 
v. Building Inspector of Bourne5 is the latest judicial tribute to the 
persistence of those favoring and opposing the use of certain land for 
shipyard purposes.6 Upon failure of a variance and two amendments to 
4343 Mass. 321,178 N.E.2d 580 (1961). 
II 343 Mass. 284,178 N.E.2d 285 (1961). 
6 See Atherton v. Board of Appeals of Bourne, 334 Mass. 451, 136 N .E.2d 201 
(1956), noted in 1956 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §1.2, and Atherton v. Selectmen of 
Bourne, 337 Mass. 250, 149 N.E.2d 232 (1958), noted in 1958 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law 
3
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the zoning by-law, the present case involved a change incidental to a 
comprehensive rezoning of the town. No changes having occurred in 
the condition of the area in the past years, the rezoning of the tract 
involved to a general use district was held still invalid despite its being 
done as part of a general revision of the entire zoning by-law. In 
Town of Tewksbury v. Thuillier7 the Court upheld, as valid public 
notice of adoption of a zoning by-law, under G.L., c. 40, §32, posting 
of attested copies of the by-law as approved by the Attorney General. 
§13.2. Variances. One hitherto unresolved problem concerning 
the grant of a variance was settled in Dion v. Board of Appeals of 
Waltham.1 In the course of the Superior Court hearing, the judge 
denied a request that the risk of non-production of evidence was upon 
the board of appeals, in showing that the prerequisites of G.L., c. 40A, 
§15(3), were met. While not necessary to the decision of this case, the 
Supreme Judicial Court stated that the lower court had ruled incor-
rectly and that the risk of non-production was upon the person seek-
ing the variance and the board of appeals ordering the variance. The 
decision does not, as the Court noted, settle the question of the ulti-
mate burden of proof in the sense of the risk of non-persuasion.2 The 
Court's determination that the risk of non-production rests upon those 
asserting that a variance was properly granted is completely logical 
under its restrictive interpretation of the power to grant variances. If 
variances are to be granted only upon findings that Section 15(3) re-
quirements are fully met, those who wish to establish these findings 
should be required to introduce the necessary evidence. 
The D,ion case also settled the interpretation of the phrase in G.L., 
c. 40A, §15(3), authorizing the board of appeals to grant a variance 
"upon appeal, or upon petition in cases where a particular use is 
sought for which no permit is required." The Court refused to limit 
the language to require that a permit be sought in cases in which it is 
obvious that the zoning law does not permit the desired use. In this 
situation direct petition to the board was held to be authorized. 
Procedural matters concerning the granting of variances were of im-
portance both in legislation and judicial decision during the 1962 SUR-
VEY year. Acts of 1962, c. 201, amended Section 17 of G.L., c. 40A, to 
alter the initial notice of a petition for variance, as also other appeals, 
before a board of appeals from twenty-one to fourteen days prior to 
the hearing. The notice henceforth must include a description of the 
subject matter of the hearing, in sufficient detail to identify it. 
§§14.2, 14.5. A third case was decided in the Superior Court without an appeal 
being taken. 
7M5 Mass. 459, 179 N.E.2d 271 (1962). 
§15.2. 11962 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1055, 185 N.E.2d 479, also noted in §12.7 supra. \ 
2 The Court noted the case of Pendergast v. Board of Appeals of Barnstable, 551 
Mass. 555, 120 N.E.2d 916 (1954), on the point. The Dion case has been held to 
require a rehearing in the later case of Sullivan v. Board of Appeals of Canton. 
1962 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1409. 185 N.E.2d 756. because very little evidence was intro-
duced. 
4
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Section 18 of Chapter 40A was ~wice amended. Acts of 1962, c. 203, 
inserted a requirement that the board of appeals' rules for conducting 
its business henceforth be filed with the city or town clerk. Acts of 
1962, c. 387, imposes an obligation upon the board to make its decision 
within ninety days after the date of filing of an appeal, application or 
petition. 
The necessity of stating as findings that each of the separate pre-
requisites of G.L., c. 40A, §15(3), exists was again reiterated by the 
Supreme Judicial Court during the 1962 SURVEY year. In Barnhart v. 
Board of Appeals of ScituateS the Court found that the lack of a board 
finding of substantial hardship to the applicant should have resulted in 
a Superior Court decision that the grant of the variance was invalid. 
The Court also noted that the Superior Court's failure to find that 
all prerequisites existed prevented support of its decree that the vari-
ance had been properly granted. The same lack of proper findings 
resulted in the determination that the decree granting a variance was 
invalid in Coolidge v. Zoning Board of Appeals of Framingham.4 
The Dion casel> also involved the issue of stating the findings nec-
essary for the grant of a variance in a somewhat different aspect. The 
original decision of May 3rd did not set forth all necessary findings. 
The board of appeals, on May 20th, in executive session, amended 
its decision to include all necessary findings and ratified this action in 
public meeting on May 24th. The Court held it was within the 
board's inherent administrative power to amend its decision within a 
reasonable time, which extended at least for the twenty-day appeal 
period. 
The Pendergast doctrine6 was again determinative in the case of 
Bruzzese v. Board of Appeals of Hingham.7 The Superior Court had 
ruled that the board of appeals was arbitrary and unreasonable in de-
nying a zoning variance. The Supreme Judicial Court reversed, find-
ing neither unreasonableness nor arbitrariness, and finding no denial 
of the variance by the board upon a legally untenable ground. These 
two grounds are the only ones upon which a court can reverse the de-
nial of a variance by a local board. Since a variance need not be 
granted by a local board even if all the prerequisites are satisfied,8 a 
finding that the decision of a board denying a variance is arbitrary 
and unreasonable can seldom be sustained. 
§13.3. Conditional variances. Acts of 1960, c. 326, added to Section 
18 of G.L., c. 40A, a provision that limited or conditional zoning vari: 
ances and special permits are to be recorded and that the grants have 
no effect until recorded in the appropriate registry. Acts of 1962, 
8343 Mass. 455, 179 N.E.2d 251 (1962). 
4343 Mass. 742,180 N.E.2d 670 (1962). 
I> 1962 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1035, 183 N.E.2d 479. See §12.7 supra, note 1. 
6 Pendergast v. Board of Appeals of Barnstable, 331 Mass. 555, 120 N.E.2d 916 
(1954), discussed in detail in 1954 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §I4.25. 
7343 Mass. 421,179 N.E.2d 269 (1962). 
8 Sheehan v. Board of Appeals of Saugus, 332 Mass. 188, 124 N.E.2d 253 (1955), 
noted in 1956 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §13.2. 
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c. 212, amended the section to shift the responsibility for recording from 
the city or town clerk to the landowner. 
The new Boston and Cambridge zoning ordinances include provi-
sions for lot-area, floor-area ratios, i.e., that the floor area of structures 
built upon land so zoned is not to exceed a certain ratio of the lot or 
tract area. These provisions require that some public record be main-
tained of building permits that affect floor areas of buildings, so that 
conveyancers can assure their clients that the lot or tract complies with 
the zoning laws. Legislation has been proposed to require recording of 
building permits in the registries of deeds,l similar to the provisions 
governing conditional variances. These bills were submitted to the 
Judicial Council by Resolves of 1961, c. 4. The Council considered 
other proposals as well as those submitted to it, and retained the matter 
for further study.2 
Zoning has created serious problems for conveyancers, who often 
have no means of determining if land complies with zoning regula-
tions. Ideally, purchasers of property should be able to obtain, at 
reasonable cost, an opinion that no infractions of zoning regulations 
exist or a listing of the infractions. No present system of recording 
exists in which it is possible to gain this information. The 1960 act, 
by throwing the burden of recording upon the registries for the one 
small type of zoning limitation covered, may well have made an un-
desirable policy decision. This becomes obvious when one considers 
the burden upon the registries - and conveyancers - if building per-
mits are also to be recorded in the registries. The 1960 act was also 
subject to criticism in failing to define the term "limited and condi-
tional variances." What are they? There is no statutory definition 
or even language of aid. Most variances are by their very terms 
"limited" since few, if any, permit any and all use of the land involved. 
Does this mean all variances should be recorded? A number of con-
veyancers have sufficient doubt so that they feel that the only safe 
policy at least is to record all variances. 
The problems presented by this small piece of legislation again 
point out the necessity for a rethinking of the zoning enabling act 
and related legislation. The recording and title registration acts made 
possible the shift of the land law from the era of family property to 
that in which land is treated as an article of commerce. But the advent 
of zoning and other restrictions upon land use has added another 
factor to the equation. No longer can land be treated like automo-
biles or shares of stock. The regulation of land consists of a con-
tinuing series of restrictions. The owner or occupant must comply 
with these ever-present regulations. The recording acts and the record-
ing provisions of other laws fail to give him a ready source of informa-
tion upon which to determine if his land complies with at least the 
more sophisticated types of land use regulation. We thus have an 
area of increasing importance to purchasers and owners of land for 
§13.3. 1 Senate No. 255 of 1961, House Nos. 1369, 1370 of 1961. 
2 Thirty-seventh Report of the Judicial Council, Pub. Doc. No. 144 (1961), p. 88. 
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which we have made no adequate informational provisions. Any re-
vision of land regulation law in the Commonwealth must consider this 
information - or lack of information - problem as of primary im-
portance. 
§13.4. Nonconforming uses. Section 5 of G.L., c. 40A, governs the 
regulation by cities and towns of nonconforming uses. The non-use 
of nonconforming buildings can be regulated so as not to prolong 
the life of the use, but the terminating time limit for non-use as it 
relates to agriculture, horticulture and floriculture has been statutorily 
set at no less than five years. Acts of 1962, c. 340, amended the section 
to provide further benefits for nonconforming agricultural, horticul-
tural and floricultural uses. Except for greenhouses within residential 
areas, local regulations can no longer affect the alteration, rebuilding 
or expansion of nonconforming buildings used for these purposes, as 
long as setback requirements are met, and cannot limit the expansion 
of the amount of the land used for these purposes. 
The rather peculiar and certainly generally inoffensive nature of 
these particular uses may appropriately be considered in limiting local 
regulation of nonconforming uses. As a policy, however, local author-
ity should be given considerable power to force removal of noncon-
forming uses. When a flexible zoning system is intelligently used, 
there seems no reason to assume, for example, that residential and cer-
tain types of commercial and industrial uses cannot sensibly and 
desirably be located adjoining each other. But some nonconforming 
uses, particularly if not' sufficiently insulated from adjoining property, 
should be removable by local authorities. Mixed uses are either 
objectionable or not dependent upon circumstances. If objectionable, 
by objective standards, the less desirable of two mixed uses should be 
subject to removal under reasonable limitations. It would ordinarily 
be true that the particular uses covered by the present amendment are 
of the type that would not be ordinarily objectionable. But one can 
envisage situations in which the devotion of large amounts of land 
within a community to these uses might disrupt its master plan for 
services, facilities, schools and similar functions. Perhaps some leeway, 
subject to strict standards, should be given to local authorities. 
Chilson v. Zoning Board of Appeal of Attlebor01 decided several 
important aspects of nonconforming use law in the Commonwealth. 
An application to change an old cement-block building to a new, 
larger, masonry gasoline service station was granted by the defendant 
board. The history of the nonconforming service station use revealed 
that, at the time of the adoption of the zoning ordinance, the service 
station and pumps were located in front of a grocery store building 
adjoining the cement-block building, both buildings then being under 
single ownership. The cement-block building was being used for an 
electric foaming or plating business at this time. In 1946 the street 
facing the buildings was relocated, and the land upon which the pumps 
§1!1.4. 11962 Mass. Adv. Sh. 855, 182 N.E.2d 535. 
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stood in front of the store was taken. The pumps were then moved 
to a location in front of the cement-block building. The change in 
pump location was approved by the city building inspector. The lot 
came under divided ownership in 1950, when the grocery store-old 
service station building - was sold. The cement-block building was 
sold to the present owners in 1952. The Supreme Judicial Court 
found difficulty in determining, under the local zoning ordinance, any 
authorization to change the location of the nonconforming use from 
one to the other building, but the Court felt it unnecessary to reach 
that issue. Since the move of the nonconforming use from one build-
ing to the other was colorably within the ordinance provisions, and 
the property had, after the building inspector had consented to the 
move, been sold to new owners, the Court felt it would be unreason-
able and unjust to upset the decision of the building inspector. Since 
this suit was brought by adjoining landowners, the rule that a munici-
pality cannot be barred by estoppel or laches was not applicable.2 The 
Court thus decided that it had to determine this case as one to 
change and enlarge a valid nonconforming use. 
The issue then before the Court was whether the city had the 
authority to grant the requested permit. The board had properly 
granted the permit under the local ordinance provisions, requiring 
findings of unnecessary hardship and lack of injury to the neighbor-
hood and the value of nearby property. Thus the Court had to deter-
mine to what extent a zoning ordinance could make special provision 
for property that has been a nonconforming use. General Laws, c. 
40A, §5, merely requires that, when changes occur that destroy the 
nonconforming use exemption, the property shall then be subject to 
the normal zoning rules for the particular district. The Court found 
that the requirement in general zoning law for uniformity of classifica-
tion did not require property subject to a nonconforming use to be 
treated the same as other property within the district. A change in 
the type and extent of use from the nonconforming use raises special 
classification issues. Thus a change from one nonconforming use to 
another no less detrimental to the area is permissible because of the 
special classification of nonconforming property. While an exact line 
cannot be drawn, certainly a local board cannot be given unfettered 
discretion. But, in the present case, the proposed alteration and build-
ing were a change in use that is permitted as a reasonable substitution 
of facilities. 
The Court stressed that the tests of unnecessary hardship and of lack 
of injury to the neighborhood and adjoining property values, which 
were the tests of the local ordinance, were not the only conditions that 
had to be met to validate a change in nonconforming use. It is also 
essential that there be established a reasonable relation to the prior 
nonconforming use in the environs of the zone in which it is located. 
This latter aspect of the opinion is particularly important. Section 5 
2 Sears v. Treasurer and Receiver General, 1127 Mass. 1110. 1127. 98 N.E.2d 621. 632 
(1951); Town of Lincoln v. Giles. 1117 Mass. 185. 187. 57 N.E.2d 554. 555 (1944). 
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limits changes in nonconforming uses so slightly that local authorities 
can be excused for forgetting that the general function of zoning itself 
is also a factor in determining the validity of a proposed alteration or 
addition to a nonconforming use. The opinion is a welcome re-
minder that local authority in this area is not as broad as it may at 
first blush seem. 
City of Medford v. Marinucci Bros. & Co.S dealt with, among other 
problems,4 the issues of abandonment and enlargement of a noncon-
forming use. The Court found neither upon the special facts which 
involved a railroad right of way and dumping operations upon land 
owned by the Commonwealth for highway purposes. The railroad 
had not sought nor obtained a certificate of abandonment from the 
Interstate Commerce Commission, and this was held determinative of 
the abandonment issue. The enlargement of use argument was con-
sidered ineffective since the dumping operations complained of took 
place upon state land, which is not subject to local zoning. Any en-
largement of the use outside of state land fell into the acceptable 
category of increase in the amount of business and not into the 
unacceptable category of those uses which are different in kind in its 
effect upon the neighborhood. 
§13.5. Local zoning vs. state property and functions. The main 
issue in City of Medford v. Marinucci Bros. & CO.1 was the power of 
the city to subject state land and state highway construction by a 
private contractor to local zoning and building codes. The Court 
rejected the city'S contentions. It considered that Teasdale v. Newell 
& Snow ling Construction CO.2 was determinative; that case had held 
that the state may exercise its control over its property to carry out 
its functions, unfettered by any local regulation not specifically author-
ized by the General Court to cover these state properties and functions. 
Thus the state is, unless the enabling act would specifically so indicate, 
exempt from municipal zoning and building codes. The defendant 
contractor is, while building the highway, carrying out a state function 
and his use of the land is covered by the state exemption; he is the 
Commonwealth's agent. 
The contract between the state and the defendant contractor called 
for compliance by the contractor with all municipal ordinances. The 
Court ignored the third-party beneficiary aspects of the city's suit 
insofar as it interpreted this provision to require compliance with 
only those ordinances that did not frustrate or even hinder contract 
performance. The language relieving the contractor from local regu-
lation that only hinders his performance could give rise to a number 
of interesting arguments. It should not be interpreted to relieve the 
contractor from minor inconvenience; certainly compliance with local 
81962 Mass. Adv. Sh. 45l1, 181 N.E.2d 584. 
4 See §§ll1.5, 18.20 infra. 
§ll1.5. 1 1962 Mass. Adv. Sh. 45l1, 181 N.E.2d 584. See §IU supra. 
2192 Mass. 440, 78 N.E. 504 (1906). 
9
Huber: Chapter 13: Land Use and Planning Law
Published by Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School, 1962
158 1962 ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETTS LAW §13.6 
traffic rules may in a sense occasionally hinder construction, but 
exemption could hardly be granted. The solution may well lie fairly 
in a balancing of the hindrance of the contractor's function with the 
importance of the public policy the local ordinance seeks to enforce. 
On any scale, a city's interest in a temporary use of land for non-
residential purposes during the building of a highway, the land to be 
used after construction for highway purposes anyway, does not rank 
high. The safety of persons and property enforced by traffic laws, on 
the other hand, is a public function of such importance that overrid-
ing these laws would probably require specific legislative authorization 
or an emergency, neither of which is likely to occur in highway con-
struction. 
§13.6. Special permits. Mahoney v. Board of Appeals of Winches-
ter1 presents the strange picture of the Supreme Judicial Court declar-
ing that the local board and the Superior Court had been too strict 
in denying the plaintiff a special permit for an exception. While 
agreeing that the board could impose reasonable restrictions upon the 
use of the proposed greenhouse, possibly even as to the duration of 
its use, the Court found the absolute denial of the permit to be arbi-
trary. It thus brought the facts within the Pendergast doctrine2 by 
finding this was one of the exceptional cases which, under that doc-
trine, permitted reversal of the local board. There is a serious ques-
tion whether the local board was arbitrary in its decision even if it 
was very restrictive. But this involves a matter of judgment on the 
facts of the particular case. It may properly be noted, however, that 
the determination of arbitrariness is somewhat unexpected from the 
same Court that decided Bruzzese v. Board of Appeals of Hingham.s 
The Bruzzese case, however, involved a variance, which need not be 
granted even when all of the statutory prerequisites are met. In 
Mahoney the Court was considering a special permit, which presump-
tively must be granted if it can be shown that all of the conditions 
imposed by statutes and the local zoning law have been met. Thus, de-
spite the fact that in form local zoning law generally refers to grants of 
permits as involving discretion in the local granting authority, the 
difference in theory between variances and permits warrants the dif-
ference in decision in these two cases. 
§13.7. Construction problems. Several cases decided during the 
1962 SURVEY year involved construction of local ordinances or by-laws 
but, either because the questioned terminology is fairly general in zon-
ing regulations or because it has importance in general zoning law, the 
cases should be briefly noted. Van Arsdale v. Town of Provincetown1 
decided that a structure consisting of two wings, each with two apart-
ments, with each wing separated from the other by a dividing wall, 
§1!!.6. 11962 Mass. Adv. Sh. 109!!, 18!! N.E.2d 850. 
2 Pendergast v. Board of Appeals of Barnstable, !!!!1 Mass. 555, 120 N.E.2d 916 
(1954), 1954 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §14.25. 
S !!4!! Mass. 421, 179 N.E.2d 269 (1962), noted in §1!!.2 supra. 
§l!I.7. 11962 Mass. Adv. Sh. 555, 180 N.E.2d 597. 
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was still a single dwelling and thus violated the zoning restrictions to 
single or two-family dwellings. Recognizing certain similarities to 
separate business buildings that have a common party wall, the Su-
preme Judicial Court felt constrained to interpret the by-law provision 
to exclude the joinder of two two-family dwellings. The Court also 
ruled that a deck attached to a dwelling was exempt from setback 
requirements, being an accessory use. Under the by-law they were 
held not to be part of the adjacent buildings, although under a 
differently worded by-law they could have been. 
Two cases, Town of Manchester v. Phillips2 and Town of Brewster 
v. Sherman,s determined that a mobile home, even with its wheels 
removed and permanently affixed to the land, does not fit into the 
category of a detached one-family dwelling. Both cases depend upon 
interpretation of local by-laws but stress that the common under-
standing of a one-family dwelling does not include mobile homes no 
matter what their permanence. Municipalities, if any, that wish to 
authorize such homes in residence districts will have to do so by 
specific language.4 
§13.8. Unconstitutionally vague zoning regulations. The first, if 
not always necessarily the most important, element in any law is that 
it be understandable. If it is so vague or ambiguous that its meaning 
is undeterminable, the law deprives those affected of due process of 
law. In O'Connell v. City of Brockton Board of Appeals1 the Supreme 
Judicial Court found that setback requirements of the Brockton zon-
ing ordinance failed to meet due process standards. The offending 
section read as follows: "Where in a residence district . . . at least 
one-half of the buildings situated on either side of a street between 
two intersecting streets conform to a minimum setback line, no new 
building shall be erected . . . to project beyond such setback line." 2 
The Court first found it impossible to determine if "either" referred 
to only one side or to both sides of the street. Even more confusing 
was the attempt to determine what distance was intended by the 50 
percent minimum setback line. The Court by example found eight 
possible solutions plus the possibility that, on the facts of the hypo-
thetical, no setback line to which an owner can conform could be 
found. Any ordinance this indefinite is unconstitutionally vague. 
The Court also had difficulty with the height requirements of the 
zoning law. One possible construction, as applied to apartment 
2343 Mass. 591, 180 N.E.2d 333 (1962). 
8343 Mass. 598, 180 N.E.2d 338 (1962). 
4 Building Inspector of Chelmsford v. Buxton, 343 Mass. 439, 179 N .E.2d 229 
(1962), involved the determination if sand and gravel were being removed from 
land lawfully in connection with construction thereon or whether they were being 
removed unlawfully for commercial purposes. The main importance of the case 
lies in its distinguishing of Cities Service Oil Co. v. Board of Appeals of Bedford, 
338 Mass. 719, 157 N.E.2d 225 (1959), noted in 1959 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §12.4. 
§13.8. 11962 Mass. Adv. Sh. 631, 181 N.E.2d 800. 
2 Revised Ordinances of Brockton, c. 26, §ll (1949). 
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houses, would have limited their height more extensively than single-
family residences. The Court noted that this construction would 
raise constitutional doubts and thus interpreted the provisions to per-
mit the same heights for residences and apartments. 
The two provisions of the Brockton ordinance discussed by the 
Court constitute almost a parody of a zoning law. Zoning regula-
tions, it is true, are often insufficiently complex to take care of the 
multitude of personal and property problems that can arise in a 
municipality. But a call for more extensive legislation is not a call 
for length without sense. These provisions have an Alice in Wonder-
land quality - charmingly confusing and devoid of a really logical 
approach to problems as they actually exist. When a law is meant 
to give a landowner a solution to a problem facing him, he should 
be able to find the solution. Indefiniteness and vagueness give too 
much discretion to those administering the law, discretion the worse 
for any real failure to set necessary standards. The administrator, in 
effect, becomes an unconstitutional legislator. 
§13.9. Zoning and home rule. The continuing pattern of legisla-
tive curtailment of local discretion in zoning matters is revealed in 
nearly every amendment to G.L., c. 40A, adopted by the General Court 
since the enabling act became law in 1954. Typical is Acts of 1962, 
c. 350, which exempts a family-unit fallout shelter from all provisions 
of local zoning laws and also all non-administrative provisions of local 
building codes. This law may well, of itself, be sound in its sub-
stantive rules, but it takes away from municipalities another area of 
regulation. Municipalities in the Comm~mwealth have resisted for 
some years the creation of effective regional agencies in the land use 
area. To get necessary uniformity, therefore, the General Court has 
established many limitations. A regional organization would probably 
devise more effective zoning, and thus avoid the real or fancied neces-
sity of continual state interference. While blocking the front doors 
against regional agencies in the name of home rule, the back door 
is left open for the state to reduce actual home rule in this field. 
§13.10. Zoning procedure: Review. Natick had, at the time 
Church v. Building Inspector of Natick 1 arose, a single code entitled 
"The Building Code and Zoning By-Laws." The petitioner sought a 
writ of mandamus to command the respondent to issue a permit denied 
because the proposed building did not have sufficient frontage on a 
street. The Supreme Judicial Court noted the zoning enabling act 
provision for appeals to local boards of appeals upon denial of a per-
mit,2 and that Natick provides for such an appeal in its code. It held 
frontage requirements to be in the nature of zoning rather than build-
ing regulation, and that the zoning procedure therefore applied. The 
Court distinguished Rice v. Board of Appeals of Dennis,8 which had 
held that the zoning enabling act procedure was not to be followed 
§llUO. 1 M!l Mass. 266. 178 N.E.2d 272 (1961), also noted in §12.6 supra. 
2 C.L .• c. 40A. §1!l. 
8 !l42 Mass. 499. 174 N.E.2d !l55 (1961). 
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when the denial sought to be appealed was made under provisions of 
the local building code rather than the local zoning by-Iaw_ Despite 
the joinder of building and zoning regulations under one municipal 
code, the provisions here involved plainly relate to zoning. 
B. SUBDIVISION CONTROL 
§13.Il. Planning board disapproval: Necessity for regulations. 
The Supreme Judicial Court has interpreted C.L., c. 41, §8IQ, to be 
a directive that local planning boards must adopt their own rules and 
regulations before subjecting property to requirements under sub-
division control.1 In Castle Estates, Inc. v. Park and Planning Board 
of Medfield 2 the board approved a plan subject to three conditions, 
including the following: (I) installation of a suitable water distribu-
tion system connected with the public water supply system, and (2) 
purchase of a drainage easement over adjoining land. The Court 
agreed with the subdivider that the state enabling act and the local 
subdivision control regulations did not authorize these two specific 
conditions. A subdivider should know in advance the requirements 
for street construction and public utilities. The statute includes no 
requirements of the type the board sought to impose, and the very 
general language of the local regulations gives a subdivider no precise 
information on requirements. The Court further noted: 
The planning board ... cannot impose conditions of this type 
upon its approval of subdivisions, where it has not included ... 
in its regulations provisions defining (a) what ways and utilities 
are or may be required in connection with subdivision plans; (b) 
what standards are to be applied by the board exercising any 
powers given to it by the regulations to withhold approval and 
to impose conditions; and (c) what those powers are.S 
The opinion constitutes another but even clearer notice that plan-
ning boards cannot proceed in the subdivision control area without 
having furnished ample directions to subdividers. This interpretation 
of C.L., c. 41, §8IQ, removes some areas of administrative discretion 
but no areas that should fairly be within planning board authority. 
Some board members have tended to assert authority much beyond 
that permitted to them; the requirements of detailed rules and regula-
tions remove in large part this area of administrative license without 
in any way undermining the valid purposes of the subdivision control 
law. 
§13.12. Zoning regulations: Time of compliance. While a pro-
§13.1l. 1 DoHner v. Planning Board of Millis, !l4!l Mass. 1, 175 N.E.2d 919 (1961), 
noted in 1961 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §12.10. See Pieper v. Planning Board of 
Southborough, 340 Mass. 157, 163 N.E.2d 14 (1959), noted in 1960 Ann. Surv. Mass. 
Law §§12.7, 13.7, 13.11. 
21962 Mass. Adv. Sh. 769, 182 N.E.2d 540. 
81962 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 774, 182 N.E.2d at 545. 
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posed subdivision must comply with local zoning, a past tendency of 
many municipalities has been to change zoning to prohibit or limit 
the proposed development. Acts of 1959, c. 221, amended Section 7A 
of G.L., c. 40A, so that the zoning regulations are frozen, as to a partic-
ular developer, as of the date of submission of his preliminary plan. 
Ward &- Johnson, Inc. v. Planning Board of Whitman1 involved exactly 
the sequence of zoning amendments after plan submission that Sec-
tion 7A was designed to make ineffective, and the Court so held. 
§13.13. Legislation. Three relatively minor changes in the sub-
division control law were adopted during the 1962 SURVEY year. The 
most important was Acts of 1962, c. 313, amending Section 81X of 
Chapter 41. Section 81X governs registration of the plan, and requires 
that no plan is to be recorded unless it contains one of several indorse-
ments on attached certificates. The new amendment prescribes that 
these indorsements and certificates are to be final and conclusive upon 
all parties. An exception to the conclusiveness is made, however, as 
it is subjected to the provisions of Section 81W, which governs the 
limited powers of the board to modify, amend or rescind its approval 
of a plan. 
Acts of 1962, c. 207, amends Section 81T relative to notice of the 
hearing on the plan. Notice must specifically include the time and 
place of the hearing and enough indication of the subject matter so 
that it can be identified. The provision that notice costs should be 
borne by the applicant was deleted. Fourteen instead of ten days' 
notice prior to hearing, plus two publications, are now required. The 
act also amended Section 81AA, governing hearings before the board 
of appeals, to add the requirement of identification of the subject 
matter and the fourteen-day notice period. 
The problem will sometimes occur that the ways and municipal 
services that are required by the local subdivision control regulations 
may be inadequate because of other municipal needs. Thus it would 
be desirable that a subdivider be required to build in accordance with 
municipal needs, but obvious problems of taking of property exist. 
Acts of 1962, c. 570, solves this problem sensibly for the town of Lex-
ington by authorizing it to reimburse subdividers for "part of the 
costs of constructing ways or installing municipal services ... of a 
greater width or size than would be required to serve the subdivision 
alone." Certain problems of language exist. Need reimbursement 
equal the increased costs? What of the value of any additional land 
required for the ways? The language may be sufficiently flexible to 
meet possible constitutional arguments, but more precision might be 
expected. 
C. URBAN RENEWAL 
§13.14. Prudential project. What is to be the last opinion of the 
Supreme Judicial Court on the questions involved in the Prudential 
§13.12. 1343 Mass. 466,179 N.E.2d 331 (1962). 
14
Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law, Vol. 1962 [1962], Art. 16
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/asml/vol1962/iss1/16
§13.15 LAND USE AND PLANNING LAW 163 
Center development in Boston was decided during the 1962 SURVEY 
year. 1 In Dodge v. Prudential Insurance Co. of America,2 the Court 
upheld the amendments to Chapter 121A of the General Laws enacted 
by Acts of 1960, c. 652. The substance of these amendments was con-
sidered constitutional in an earlier advisory opinion of the Court,3 
and the Court accepted its earlier views as correctly stating the law 
in respect to the statute and the contract entered into between the 
city and Prudential. 
Several points covered in the opinion perhaps deserve brief com-
ment. The Court reiterated its earlier determination that the elimina-
tion of a blighted open area is a public purpose.4 Thus an urban 
redevelopment corporation, carrying out a public purpose, can be 
given favored tax treatment. The history of the public purpose doc-
trine in Massachusetts is an interesting study in change of result 
without rejection of earlier developed theory.1i The Court has been 
unwilling to accept a concept of public benefit as being adequate 
to meet public purpose requirements. But the Court seems to flirt 
with the doctrine in its fairly persistent citation of Berman v. Parker,6 
which accepted the public benefit theory as constitutional under fed-
eral standards. In the Dodge case, the Berman case is cited to estab-
lish the constitutionality of the project as against federal constitutional 
objections, and "its reasoning is decisive under our Constitution as to 
contentions respecting the instrumentalities which have been chosen 
by the legislature." The Court thus accepts the Berman rationale to 
the extent that, once public purpose has been established, the choice 
of means is up to the legislature and the judiciary has no review 
function. This constant flirting with Berman, even while distinguish-
ing it, suggests the correctness of a statement made by the most experi-
enced urban renewal lawyer in the Commonwealth, that the Court 
will accept Berman when it is faced with facts on which the older 
"public purpose" doctrine gives an obviously socially undesirable 
result. 
§13.15. Contract with developer: Conditions for effectiveness. 
Town of Brookline v. Brookline Redevelopment Authorityl considered 
the necessary preliminary conditions that must be met before a valid 
contract between a redevelopment authority and a redeveloper comes 
into existence. The authority had negotiated a contract with the 
§13.l4. 1 See, for several of the cases, Opinions of the Justices, 341 Mass. 760, 
168 N.E.2d 858 (1960); !Hl Mass. 738, 167 N.E.2d 745 (1960); 332 Mass. 769, 126 
N.E.2d 795 (1955). 
2343 Mass. 375, 179 N.E.2d 234 (1961). 
3 Opinion of the Justices, 341 Mass. 760, 168 N.E.2d 858 (1960). 
4341 Mass. at 776·777, 780·781,168 N.E.2d at 868·869, 870·871. 
Ii See Nichols, The Meaning of Public Use in the Law of Eminent Domain, 20 
B.U.L. Rev. 615 (1940); Huber, Public Policy and the Eminent Domain Power, in 
State Government and Public Responsibility, 1960 Tufts Assembly on Massachu-
setts Government (Robbins ed. 1960). 
6348 U.S. 26, 75 Sup. Ct. 98, 99 L. Ed. 27 (1954). 
§13.15. 11962 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1051, 183 N.E.2d 484. 
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redeveloper, the form and content of which were approved by the 
Housing and Home Finance Agency. In its approval the H.H.F.A. 
reminded the authority it had to comply with two L.P.A. letters before 
it could execute the contract. These letters set out requirements de-
signed to prevent improvident awarding of negotiated redevelopment 
contracts. 
Upon receipt of the approval the authority adopted resolutions de-
signed to initiate compliance with the L.P.A. letters. It also adopted 
a resolution which in part was as follows: 
The Land Disposition Contract ... heretofore negotiated by the 
Authority and the redeveloper ... is hereby approved, confirmed 
and ratified, and upon completion of the requirements of [the 
L.P.A. letters and certain federal statutes] the Executive Director 
of this authority or any member thereof ... is authorized and 
directed to execute said contract .... 
The redeveloper argued that this resolution constituted a present 
agreement by the authority to be bound by the contract, subject only 
to compliance with the L.P.A. letters. The Supreme Judicial Court 
rejected this argument. The terms of the L.P.A. letters obviously re-
quire compliance before a contract is to be entered into, since they 
govern public disclosures and hearings among other requirements. If 
an authority could bind itself before complying with the letters, the 
whole purpose of the letter requirements would be subverted. 
§13.16. Legislation. Governor Volpe's proposal for a reorganiza-
tion of the various departments and divisions concerned with rede-
velopment, renewal and housing was not adopted,l but some other 
statutory changes in the urban renewal laws were enacted. Acts of 
1960, c. 776, added certain new provisions to the General Laws, relat-
ing to state financial assistance to the various urban renewal projects. 
Acts of 1962, c. 643, amended several provisions of the relevant sections. 
Section 26FFF of Chapter 121, covering payment of the grants, was 
amended to redefine the formula as it r.elates to those projects in 
which the municipality pays planning and administrative expenses; 
the state share is to be limited to one sixth of the net project cost. 
Payment of the grant was changed from a five- to twenty-year period 
of equal annual payments, subject to adjustment of the amounts by 
the Division of Urban and Industrial Renewal as the final costs of the 
project are determined. Section 26HHH of Chapter 121, concerning 
state grants to nonfederally aided commercial or industrial projects, 
was extensively revised to assure that the state grant will be one half 
of the project cost, to aid local agencies with the financing of their 
plans for a project of this type, and to provide for twenty equal annual 
payments. 
Acts of 1962, c. 764, repealed Acts of 1962, c. 115, and enacted certain 
§1~.l6. 1 Senate No. 6~8 of 1961, designed to establish a Department of Eco-
nomic Development and Community Renewal, as well as to recodify the state's 
urban renewal legislation. 
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provlSlons for emergency finance board approval of housing board 
expenditures for redevelopment and land assembly projects.2 
D. HOUSING 
§13.17. Anti-discrimination law. In Massachusetts Commission 
Against Discrimination v. Colangelol the Supreme Judicial Court up-
held the application of the state anti-discrimination law as it applies 
to all multiple housing. General Laws, c. 15lB, §4(6), as adopted by 
amendment in 1959,2 requires owners (and others with authority) to 
rent or lease housing accommodations in "publicly assisted or multiple 
dwelling or contiguously located housing accommodations" without 
regard to "the race, creed, color or national origin" of the applicant. 
The opinion was decided basically upon constitutional grounds and 
is thus discussed elsewhere in this volume.s 
The Court did, however, discuss several issues of considerable im-
portance to the enforcement of its decree, in holding, over dissent, that 
the commission's order was too broad in certain particulars. The com-
mission ordered that the person denied accommodations be given sub-
stantially the same status as the "most favored tenant or tenants" in 
the apartments. The Court found this "most favored" phrase un-
necessarily vague, not limited to accommodations of the type sought 
by the applicant, and it could thus lead to enforcement difficulties. 
Certain other provisions of the order were made by the commission 
without its having considered evidence on the issue, since the owner 
and his rental representatives relied solely upon constitutional grounds 
at the commission hearing. Because this hearing was the first of its 
type, the Court allowed the owner or his representatives to seek fur-
ther proceedings before the commission upon the issues governed by 
those parts of the order upon which they had submitted no evidence. 
Failure to file such a request within seven days would result in a 
Court decree enforcing those additional parts of the commission order 
that govern the owner's and rental agent's general leasing policies 
rather than just the specific discriminatory act involved in this case. 
§13.18. Housing authority: Employee's power to alter contract 
orally. In Coston is v. Medford Housing Authorityl the Supreme Judi-
cial Court found that the defendant's director had the apparent 
authority to alter a building contract, and the contractor was thus 
permitted to recover for the additional work done under the direction 
of the apparent agent. The Costonis case recognized the limits of its 
doctrine - that the apparent agent must be in a position of responsi-
2 General Laws. c. 121. §26Q. was amended. The prior provision. inserted by Acts 
of 1962. c. 115. was an amendment to G.L.. c. 121. §26P. 
§13.l7. 11962 Mass. Adv. Sh. 835. 182 N.E.2d 595. 
2 Acts of 1959. c. 239. §2. 
8 See §§IO.l. 12.10 supra. 
§13.l8. 134!! Mass. 108. 176 N.E.2d 25 (1961). noted in 1961 Ann. Surv. Mass. 
Law §4.5. 
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bility of the type wherein a contractor might reasonably assume the 
authority existed. This limitation was reiterated and emphasized 
in Savignano v. Gloucester Housing Author,ity,2 in which the Court 
held that oral changes in the building contract ordered by the housing 
authority's "clerk of works" were not binding upon the authority be-
cause of any apparent agency in the clerk. It was also clear that the 
clerk could not have any authority to waive the requirements of 
written change unless approved by the chairman of the State Housing 
Board. The Court also held that contractual provisions for a watch-
man "both day and night," being unambiguous, could not be altered 
by subsequent conduct of the parties. 
§13.19. Legislation. Acts of 1962, c. 487, created a Mobile Homes 
Commission, designed to study the particular problems of such housing 
and to recommend legislation. The particular and unique problems 
of mobile housing, and its increasing use, make this commission de-
sirable, as long as its studies do not result in legislation in the land 
use area which is overly specialized in nature. Land use problems 
should properly be solved by application of the broadest possible poli-
cies and not by deferment to any particular interests such as could 
be represented by this type of commission. 
Acts of 1962, c. 784, amended G.L., c. 121, §26S, to include em-
ployees of housing authorities with five years of uninterrupted service 
within the tenure provisions up to this time applicable only to em-
ployees of the State Housing Board. 
E. BUILDING CODES, SAFETY AND HEALTH 
§13.20. Building permit: Permit from board of health as condition 
precedent. In Building Inspector of Wayland v. Ellen M. Gifford 
Sheltering Home Corp.} the petitioner sought to restrain erection 
of a building under a revoked building permit. The local town 
building code required that, before the building inspector could issue 
a building permit for a building from which sewage would issue, the 
local board of health must have issued its permit approving the sewage 
system. The respondent, planning construction of a cat shelter for 
fifty to one hundred cats, obtained a clearance from the health agent 
upon plans which included no toilet or sewage facilities. The agent 
testified it was his delegated duty to give such clearance when no 
sewage or toilet facilities were planned. In fact, of course, sewage 
disposal was required ina home for cats, and the building inspector 
revoked his earlier building permit upon his being informed by the 
board of health that a review of the plans showed that a sewage permit 
was required. The Supreme Judicial Court held that the illegally 
issued permit was revocable and affirmed the Superior Court decree 
restraining the respondent from continuing to construct the cat home. 
21962 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1173, 183 N.E.2d 862. 
§13.20. 11962 Mass. Adv. Sh. 715, 182 N.E.2d 503. 
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The case, being brought in the name of the building inspector, raised 
a possible estoppel issue, he having issued the invalid permit. The 
Court found that he sued in the name of the town and for its benefit, 
and thus no estoppel could run. 
§13.21. Fire prevention. The great danger from fires caused by 
space heaters has finally resulted in legislation prohibiting their use. 
Acts of 1962, c. 688, adds new Sections 25A and 25B to G.L., c. 148. 
Section 25A makes it a criminal offense to sell or install the various 
types of dangerous space heaters for residential purposes. Section 25B, 
effective July I, 1965, makes it a criminal offense to use or allow use 
of these heaters in any building which is used in whole or in part 
for human habitation. Acts of 1962, c. 636, immediately prohibits use 
of portable wick-type space heaters in residential buildings, by adding 
a new Section 5A to G.L., c. 148. 
The particularly great risks from fire in nursing and convalescent 
homes and rest homes require close and continual supervision. Acts 
of 1962, c. 630, adds Section 3Q to G.L., c. 143, and gives the Depart-
ment of Public Safety the right to promulgate rules and regulations for 
these homes. After hearing, the department may order installation of 
a sprinkler system in a home when it is necessary. In recognition, 
however, of the considerable costs involved in installing a sprinkler 
system, the department can require other methods of fire protection 
when a sprinkler system "would be unnecessary or impractical either 
as to location, size or construction of a home." Requirements for a 
sprinkler system in department rules and regulations are not to take 
effect until January 1, 1965. 
Acts of 1962, c. 314, authorizes the city of Boston to enact a fire 
code and validates and confirms the Boston Fire Prevention Code. 
The city fire chief may make rules and regulations consistent with the 
code and, upon his application, the Superior Court has equity juris-
diction to enforce the ordinance. 
Gas fitting and requirements for licensing of gas fitters were 
amended by Acts of 1962, cc. 488 and 623. 
§13.22. Civil defense. Acts of 1962, c. 350, exempts family-unit 
fallout shelters from a number of requirements of local building codes. 
The shelters need not comply with the code provisions as to materials 
and methods of construction, but remain subject to the administrative 
provisions of the codes, including such items as application and issu-
ance of permits, fees, inspections, penalties and enforcement. Local 
inspectors of buildings are authorized to waive requirements of con-
struction by a licensed builder if satisfied that the unlicensed builder 
can construct the shelter without danger to himself or others. The 
Director of Civil Defense is to establish family-unit fallout shelter 
standards; he is also to establish standards for shelters other than 
those limited to family units. 
§13.23. Regulation of cesspools. In Town of Holden v. Holden 
Suburban Supply Co.,1 the Supreme Judicial Court upheld the town's 
§13.23. 1343 Mass. 187. 178 N.E.2d 74 (1961). 
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authority to regulate the installation of cesspools. The Court found 
that the town regulations were as specific and detailed as the subject 
matter permitted, since location, land conditions and construction 
materials may all vary. The landowner had notice that a permit was 
required and that an inspection of the construction was required. 
"These are valid precautionary regulations to avoid future danger to 
health by improper methods of sewage disposal." 
F. EMINENT DOMAIN 
§13.24. Relocation assistance. In March, 1962, Governor Volpe 
proposed a system of relocation assistance to persons and firms dis-
placed by eminent domain.1 This bill failed of passage but, although 
more extensive and complete, is similar to other measures that were 
proposed and sent to the Judicial Council. In addition, the Legis-
lative Research Council prepared a report on relocation assistance 
during the 1962 SURVEY year.2 Other bills submitted to the Judicial 
Council covered matters of prompt payment and methods of determin-
ing damages.s The Legislative Research Bureau prepared a report on 
the conflicts with local zoning created by partial taking under eminent 
domain.4 The recent enactment by the Federal Government of reloca-
tion legislation for the federal highway program, IS somewhat similar to 
that now authorized in urban renewal,6 insures that a large number 
of other similar bills will be proposed during the forthcoming legis-
lative session. 
The large amounts of land taking involved particularly in the urban 
renewal and highway programs have created some questions as to 
whether fair market value is truly a sound measure of just compensa-
tion. Much land now taken is already developed and in some sort 
of intense use; eminent domain no longer consists merely of a taking 
of routes for highways and railroads in areas used only for agricultural 
or forest purposes. Thus, no one would contend that the average home-
owner, forced to buy a new home and move extensive belongings - or 
an average owner of a business - is fully reimbursed by a fair market 
value test. The question thus resolves itself into one of whether the 
person whose property is taken or the general public who are gaining 
the benefit of the public improvement should bear these costs. The 
trend, at least, is toward throwing these losses on the public. But, 
perhaps extraordinarily, early statutes regulating takings for water 
§llI.24. 1 See message of Governor Volpe. Journal of the Senate. March 22. 1962. 
pp. 705-707. Senate No. 682. submitting House No. lI728 of 1962. Senator Powers 
has resubmitted substantially the same legislation in the 19611 legislative session. 
2 House No. lI495 of Jan. 8. 1962. 
8 See Thirty-seventh Report of the Judicial Council. Pub. Doc. No. 144 (1961). 
pp.75-87. Thirteen separate bills were considered by the Council. 
4 House No. lI657 of Jan. 15. 1962. 
I> 28 U.S.C. §ll1l1 (1958). added by Pub. L. 87-866 of 1962. 76 Stat. 1145. 
642 U.S.C. §1456(f) (1958). as amended through Pub. L. 87-70 of 1961. 75 Stat. 149. 
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reservoir purposes go at least as far as any modern statute in permitting 
full recovery for all losses.7 
§13.25. Lease of space above municipal parking lots. Acts of 1962, 
c. 796, authorizes the board or officer in charge of off-street parking 
areas or facilities to advertise for the leasing of air space above those 
facilities, for a term not exceeding ninety-nine years. The appropriate 
governing body or executive of the city or town may accept any pro-
posal that is deemed most advantageous to the municipality. The 
lessee or his assigns are to pay taxes on an assessment base including 
the value of the underlying land. 
The statute provides a very sensible solution to making desirable 
uses of parts of public property not needed for public purposes. The 
same solution is being used in Newton in connection with the Massa-
chusetts Turnpike extension, a supermarket to be built over the right 
of way. A similar proposal relating to the turnpike and the city of 
. Boston ran into a political windmill and was not authorized. 
. A constitutional problem could arise, however, in connection with 
these types of leases. Presumptively property taken by eminent do-
'main can only be taken if it is to be used for public purposes. A lease 
of air space originally indicates that only the surface was required for 
the public purpose and thus the air space was unnecessary to the 
public project. Under even the restrictive public purpose doctrine 
followed in Massachusetts, however, the constitutional objections are 
not supportable. Assuming land is taken for a parking lot and on the 
same day advertisements for proposals for leases of the air space are 
issued, the facts still remain: (1) the city or town requires use of the 
entire surface in preparing the parking lot and may require consider-
able air space for heavy equipment; (2) the project ,above the parking 
space will require supports, the location of which must be controlled 
by the municipality to avoid conflict with the parking function. This 
analysis is supported by City of Boston v. Talbot,! which held con-
stitutional a taking of an entire building with the immediate lease 
of the portion thereof not needed for subway construction. The lease 
provisions constitute a private benefit merely incidental to the primary 
public purpose.2 
§13.26. Taking by another governmental unit: Use of proceeds. 
General Laws, c. 44, §63, has provided that the proceeds of the sale 
of municipal real estate are to be used for certain purposes. Acts of 
1962, c. 377, amended the section to include a provision that the pre-
scribed uses are to apply to funds received from "other disposal of real 
estate, including the taking by eminent domain by another govern-
mental unit." 
§13.27. Assessment of damages: Petition. Section 14 of G.L., c. 79, 
7 Acts of 1895, c. 488; Acts of 1896, c. 450; Acts of 1898, c. 450. 
§13.25. 1206 Mass. 82, 91 N.E. 1014 (1910). 
2 See Opinion of the Justices, 341 Mass. 760, 168 N.E.2d 858 (1960); Papadinis v. 
City of Somerville, 331 Mass. 627, 121 N.E.2d 714 (1954). 
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authorizes either a person suffering damages from a taking under emi-
nent domain or the taking agency to file a petition for the assessment 
of these damages. Section 16 has up to this time set a one-year statute 
of limitations upon these petitions. Acts of 1962, c. 797, has changed 
this limitation period to two years. The limitation period is also made 
retroactive to include takings that occurred prior to the enactment of 
the statute. 
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